Abstract. We study the computation of equilibria of anonymous games, via algorithms that may proceed via a sequence of adaptive queries to the game's payoff function, assumed to be unknown initially. The general topic we consider is query complexity, that is, how many queries are necessary or sufficient to compute an exact or approximate Nash equilibrium. We show that exact equilibria cannot be found via query-efficient algorithms. We also give an example of a 2-strategy, 3-player anonymous game that does not have any exact Nash equilibrium in rational numbers. However, more positive query-complexity bounds are attainable if either further symmetries of the utility functions are assumed or we focus on approximate equilibria. We investigate four sub-classes of anonymous games previously considered by [5, 15] . Our main result is a new randomized query-efficient algorithm that finds a O(n −1/4 )-approximate Nash equilibrium queryingÕ(n 3/2 ) payoffs and runs in timeÕ(n 3/2 ). This improves on the running time of pre-existing algorithms for approximate equilibria of anonymous games, and is the first one to obtain an inverse polynomial approximation in poly-time. We also show how this can be utilized as an efficient polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS). Furthermore, we prove that Ω(n log n) payoffs must be queried in order to find any ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, even by randomized algorithms.
Preliminaries
This paper studies anonymous games, in which a large number of players n share a constant number of pure strategies, and the payoff to a player depends on the number of players who use each strategy, but not their identities. Due to this property, these games have a polynomial (in n) size representation. [15] consider anonymous games and graphical games to be the two most important classes of concisely-represented multi-player games. Anonymous games appear frequently in practice, for example in voting systems, traffic routing, or auction settings. Although they have polynomial-sized representations, the representation may still be inconveniently large, making it desirable to work with algorithms that do not require all the data on a particular game of interest.
Query complexity is motivated in part by the observation that a game's entire payoff function may be syntactically cumbersome. It also leads to new results that distinguish the difficulty of alternative solution concepts. We assume that an algorithm has black-box access to the payoff function, via queries that specify an anonymized profile and return one or more of the players' payoffs.
Anonymous Games
A k-strategy anonymous game is a tuple (n, k, {u i j } i∈[n],j∈ [k] ) that consists of n players, k pure strategies per player, and a utility function u i j : Π k n−1 −→ [0, 1] for each player i ∈ [n] and every strategy j ∈ [k], whose domain is the set Π k n−1 := {(x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ IN k 0 : j∈ [k] x j = n − 1} of all possible ways to partition n − 1 players into the k strategies. The number of payoffs stored by any such game is n · Π k n−1 = O n k , i.e., polynomial in n if k is a constant, which we will always assume throughout this paper. In the special case of k = 2, we regard u i j 's input as being the number of players other than i that play strategy 1. The number of payoffs stored by a 2-strategy game clearly is then 2n 2 . As indicated by u i j 's codomain, we make a standard assumption that all payoffs are normalized into the interval [0, 1] .
Let e j denote the unit vector of length k with 1 at its j-th component. A mixed strategy of player i is represented using a random vector X i , which takes value e j with the probability that i plays j. Letting p i j be the probability that player i plays strategy j, we then have E[X i ] = p i 1 , . . . , p i k . Let X −i := ℓ∈[n]\{i} X ℓ be the sum of n − 1 such random vectors, where the subscript −i denotes all players other than i. For two-strategy games, the strategy played by player i can be represented by a Bernoulli random variable X i indicating whether or not i plays strategy 1. Hence, a mixed strategy for i simply is the probability p i := E[X i ] that i plays strategy 1. Similarly to the k-strategy case, let X −i := ℓ∈[n]\{i} X ℓ be the sum of all the random variables other than X i . The expected utility obtained by player i ∈ [n] for playing pure strategy j ∈ {1, 2} against X −i is E[u The probability mass function (p.m.f.) of X −i and X −i respectively are a Poisson Multinomial Distribution and a Poisson Binomial Distribution. Both of them can be computed in polynomial time using dynamic programming (see e.g., [15] ), i.e., expected utilities are computable in polynomial time.
Exact and Approximate Nash Equilibria.
With the above notation, we say that X i is a best-response if and only if E[u i (X )] ≥ E[u i j (X −i )] for all j ∈ [k]. A Nash equilibrium (NE) requires the players to be best-responding to each other; therefore, the above best-response condition must hold for every i ∈ [n]. This can be also viewed as no player having an incentive to deviate from her strategy. We consider a relaxation of NE, the notion of an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE), where every player's incentive to deviate is at most ǫ > 0. We say that (X i ) i∈ [n] , which represents a mixed-strategy profile, constitutes an ǫ-NE if for all i ∈ [n] and all j ∈ [k],
This definition, however, does not prohibit allocating a small amount of probability to arbitrarily bad strategies. An ǫ-approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium (ǫ-WSNE) addresses this issue by forcing every player to place a positive amount of probability solely on ǫ-approximate best-responses, i.e., (X i ) i∈ [n] constitutes an ǫ-WSNE if for all i ∈ [n], all j ∈ [k], and all ℓ ∈ supp(E[X i ]) 1 ,
Although an ǫ-WSNE is also an ǫ-NE, the converse need not be true.
Sub-classes of Anonymous Games
Motivated by our first negative result, which states that finding an exact NE in an anonymous game may require querying a number of payoffs that is proportional to the size of the game, we consider further restrictions of the players' utility function (from [5, 15] ) with the aim of getting more positive results for these. An anonymous game is symmetric if for all i, ℓ ∈ [n], all j ∈ [k], and all x ∈ Π k n−1 , then u i j (x) = u ℓ j (x), i.e., all players share the same utility function. An anonymous game is self-anonymous if for all i ∈ [n], all j, ℓ ∈ [k], and all x ∈ {y ∈ Π k n−1 : y ℓ = 0}, then u i j (x) = u i ℓ (x + e j − e ℓ ), i.e., player i's preferences depend on how all the n players are partitioned into the k strategies; therefore, i does not distinguish herself from the others.
An anonymous game is self-symmetric if it is both symmetric and self-anonymous. An anonymous game is Lipschitz if every player's utility function is Lipschitz continuous, in the sense that for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [k], and all x, y ∈ Π k n−1 , u i j (x) − u i j (y) ≤ λ x − y 1 , where λ ≥ 0 is the so-called Lipschitz constant and · 1 denotes the L 1 norm.
Query-efficiency and Payoff Query Models.
Our general interest is in polynomial-time algorithms that find solutions of anonymous games, while checking just a small fraction of the O(n k ) payoffs of an n-player, k-strategy game. The basic kind of query is a single-payoff query which receives as input a player i ∈ [n], a strategy j ∈ [k], and a partition of n − 1 players into the k strategies x ∈ Π k n−1 , and it returns the corresponding payoff u i j (x). The query complexity of an algorithm is the expected number of single-payoff queries that it needs in the worst case. Hence, an algorithm is query-efficient if its query complexity is o(n k ).
A profile query (used in [19] ) consists of an action profile (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ [k] n as input and outputs the payoffs that every player i obtains according to that profile. Clearly, any profile query can be simulated by a sequence of n single-payoff queries. Finally, an all-players query consists of a pair (j, x) for j ∈ [k], x ∈ Π k n−1 , and the response to (j, x) is the vector of all players' utilities (u 1 j (x), . . . , u n j (x)). We consider the cost of a query to be equal to the number of payoffs it returns; hence, a profile or an all-players query costs n single-payoff queries. We find that an algorithm being constrained to utilize profile queries may incur a linear loss in query-efficiency (cf. Section 2). Therefore, we focus on single-payoff and all-players queries, which better exploit the symmetries of anonymous games.
Related Work
In the last decade, there has been interest in the complexity of computing approximate Nash equilibria. A main reason is the PPAD-completeness results for computing an exact NE, for normal-form games [6, 10] (the latter paper extends the hardness also to fully polynomial-time approximation schemes (FPTAS)), and recently also for anonymous games with 7 strategies [7] . The FIXP-completeness results of [18] for multiplayer games show an algebraic obstacle to the task of writing down a useful description of an exact equilibrium. On the other hand, there exists a subexponential-time algorithm to find an ǫ-NE in normal-form games [25] , raising the well-known open question of the possible existence of a PTAS for these games.
Daskalakis and Papadimitriou proved that anonymous games admit a PTAS and provided several improvements of its running time over the past few years. Their first algorithm [11] concerns two-strategy games and is based upon the quantization of the strategy space into nearby multiples of ǫ. This result was also extended to the multi-strategy case [12] . [9] subsequently gave an efficient PTAS whose running time is poly(n) · (1/ǫ) O(1/ǫ 2 ) , which relies on a better understanding of the structure of ǫ-equilibria in two-strategy anonymous games: There exists an ǫ-WSNE where either a small number of the players -at most O(1/ǫ 3 ) -randomize and the others play pure strategies, or whoever randomizes plays the same mixed strategy. Furthermore, [13] proved a lower bound on the running time needed by any oblivious algorithm, which lets the latter algorithm be essentially optimal. In the same article, they show that the lower bound can be broken by utilizing a non-oblivious algorithm, which has the currently best-known running time for finding an ǫ-equilibrium in two-strategy anonymous games of O(poly(n) · (1/ǫ) O(log 2 (1/ǫ)) ). A complete proof is in [14] . It has been recently shown that also k-strategy anonymous games admit an efficient PTAS [16, 17] . In Section 6 we present a bound for λ-Lipschitz games, in which λ is a parameter limiting the rate at which u i j (x) changes as x changes. Any λ-Lipschitz k-strategy anonymous game is guaranteed to have an ǫ-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, with ǫ = O(λk) [2, 15] . The convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium of best-reply dynamics in the context of two-strategy Lipschitz anonymous games is studied by [3, 24] . Moreover, [5] showed that finding a pure equilibrium in anonymous games is easy if the number of strategies is constant w.r.t. the number of players n, and hard as soon as there is a linear dependence.
In the last two years, several researchers obtained bounds for the query complexity for approximate equilibria in different game settings, which we briefly survey. [19] presented the first series of results: they studied bimatrix games, graphical games, and congestion games on graphs. Similar to our negative result for exact equilibria of anonymous games, it was shown that a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game with k strategies per player requires k 2 queries, even in zero-sum games. However, more positive results arise if we move to ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria. Approximate equilibria of bimatrix games were studied in more detail in [20] .
The query complexity of equilibria of n-player games -a setting where payoff functions are exponentially-large -was analyzed in [4, 8, 21, 22] . [22] showed that exponentially many deterministic queries are required to find a 1 2 -approximate correlated equilibrium (CE) and that any randomized algorithm that finds an exact CE needs 2 Ω(n) expected cost. Notice that lower bounds on correlated equilibria automatically apply to Nash equilibria. [21] investigated in more detail the randomized query complexity of ǫ-CE and of the more demanding ǫ-wellsupported CE. [4] proved an exponential-in-n randomized lower bound for finding an ǫ-WSNE in n-player, k-strategy games, for constant k = 10 4 and ǫ = 10 −8 . Finally, [8] showed (for small enough positive ǫ) an exponential lower bound for ǫ-Nash equilibria of binary-action games. These exponential lower bounds do not hold in anonymous games, which can be fully revealed with a polynomial number of queries.
Our Results and their Significance
Query-efficiency serves as a criterion for distinguishing exact from approximate equilibrium computation. It applies to games having exponentially-large representations [22] , also for games having poly-sized representations (e.g. bimatrix games [19, 20] ). Here we extend this finding to the important class of anonymous games.
We prove that even in two-strategy anonymous (and also self-anonymous) games, an exact Nash equilibrium demands querying the payoff function exhaustively, even with the most powerful query model (Theorem 3.1). Alongside this, we provide an example of a threeplayer, two-strategy anonymous game whose unique Nash equilibrium needs all players to randomize with an irrational amount of probability (Theorem 3.2), answering a question posed in [15] . These results motivate our subsequent focus on sub-classes of anonymous game and approximate equilibria. Section 4 focuses on the search for pure exact equilibria, in subclasses of anonymous games where these are guaranteed to exist. We give tight bounds for two-strategy symmetric games, also k-strategy self-symmetric games, in the latter case via connecting them with the query complexity of searching for a local optimum of a function on a grid graph, allowing us to apply pre-existing results for that problem.
Section 5 is concerned with mixed-strategy equilibria of self-anonymous games. Although searching for exact equilibria requires the utility function to be queried exhaustively, surprisingly, a uniform randomization over all the strategies is always a O(n −1/2 )-WSNE, for games having a constant number of strategies. Therefore, no payoff needs to be queried for this. Moreover, we give a reduction that maps any general two-strategy anonymous game G to a two-strategy self-anonymous game G ′ such that if an FPTAS for G ′ exists, then there also exists one for G. The possible existence of a FPTAS is the main open algorithmic question in the context of anonymous games, thus we show that the search for an answer to this question can focus on self-anonymous games (in the two-strategy case).
In addition, we exhibit a simple query-efficient algorithm that finds an approximate pure Nash equilibrium in two-strategy Lipschitz games (Algorithm 2; Theorem 6.1), which is subsequently used by our main algorithm for anonymous games.
Our main result (Theorem 7.1) is a new randomized approximation scheme 2 for twostrategy anonymous games that differs conceptually from previous ones and offers new performance guarantees. It is query-efficient (using o(n 2 ) queries) and has improved computational efficiency. It is the first PTAS for anonymous games that is polynomial in a setting where n and 1/ǫ are polynomially related. In particular, its runtime is polynomial in n in a setting where 1/ǫ may grow in proportion to n 1/4 and also has an improved polynomial dependence on n for all ǫ ≥ n −1/4 . In more detail, for any ǫ ≥ n −1/4 , the algorithm adaptively finds a O (ǫ)-NE withÕ ( √ n) (where we useÕ(·) to hide polylogarithmic factors) all-players queries (i.e.,Õ n 3/2 single payoffs) and runs in timeÕ n 3/2 . The best-known algorithm of [15] 
In addition to this, we derive a randomized logarithmic lower bound on the number of all-players queries needed to find any non-trivial ǫ-WSNE in two-strategy anonymous games (Theorem 7.2).
Comparison of Query Models
We begin by comparing the profile query model with the other two in the context of anonymous games. Recall that one profile or one all-players query costs n single-payoff queries due to returning n payoffs. We use PR, AP, and SP to denote profile, all-players, and single-payoff queries, respectively.
Simulating Profile Queries
A PR query can be simulated by a sequence of n SP queries by requesting for each player the payoff associated with the strategy profile of the PR query.
A PR query can be simulated using at most k AP queries, as follows. Let a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ [k] n be a given profile query. Let N j ⊆ [n] be the players who play j in a. For all j ∈ [k] such that N j = ∅, we query the payoff for strategy j against the partition (|N 1 |, . . . , |N j | − 1, . . . , |N k |) ∈ Π k n−1 . The cost, therefore, increases at most by a factor of k.
Simulating Single-payoff Queries
A sequence of SP queries can obviously be simulated by a sequence of PR or AP queries having the same length. However, this approach increases the total cost by a factor of n since we receive the payoffs of every player. In general, it cannot be simulated by a shorter sequence, for example if every SP query is based on a different partition in Π k n−1 .
Simulating All-players Queries
Clearly, any AP query can be simulated by n SP queries. We consider whether AP queries can be efficiently simulated by PR queries, and argue that this is generally not the case. Clearly, n profile queries suffice to obtain all the information returned by one AP query, and there exist examples where this upper bound is required. In section 2.4, we present such an example. However, there are also cases in which an all-player query can be simulated by a constant number of profile queries. For instance, suppose we are dealing with a two-strategy anonymous game, and let α ∈ (0, 1) be a constant. If an AP query retrieves the payoff for playing strategy j ∈ {1, 2} when αn players (in total) are playing strategy j, then 1/α PR queries are enough to get all the information. Consider the following sequence of PR queries when j = 1. The case j = 2 is similar.
Clearly, every query lets αn players know their payoffs; therefore, 1/α PR queries suffice to simulate an all-players query as specified above. The above simulation suggests that if an AP query algorithm asks the payoffs for strategy j subject to the constraint that the fraction of players using j is bounded away from 0, then it can be simulated by a PR query-algorithm whose cost is only increased by a constant factor.
A Quadratic Cost Lower Bound in the Profile Model
We show that finding an ǫ-WSNE, for any ǫ < 1/2, in a two-strategy anonymous game may require a linear number of profile queries, i.e., a cost of n 2 . Due to the fact that a two-strategy anonymous game incorporates 2n 2 payoffs, such a lower bound rules out the possibility of a profile-query efficient algorithm for well-supported approximate equilibria.
Example 2.1. Let D n be the following distribution over two-strategy n-player anonymous games where every player's payoff takes a value in {0, 1 2 , 1}. Let a player h ∈ [n] be chosen uniformly at random. Let h's and the other players' (ℓ denotes a typical player different from h) payoffs be defined as in Figure 1 .
. . .
. . . Remark 2.1. Any randomized profile-query algorithm needs to make Ω(n) queries, which cost Ω(n 2 ) payoffs, to find an ǫ-WSNE of D n , for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1 2 ).
Proof (Proof sketch).
We use Yao's minimax principle. Clearly, every ℓ is always better off playing 1. As a result, the hidden player h should play 2. This is the unique exact NE and ǫ-WSNE, for ǫ < 1/2. Evidently, a profile-query algorithm must identify h -the unique player who plays 2 -by querying vectors of the form (1, . . . , 1, 2, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ {1, 2} n . If the 2 does not appear at h's index, the query returns no useful information. Due to h being chosen uniformly at random, a linear number of profile queries is required.
Remark 2.2. The all-players query (2, n − 1) ∈ {1, 2} × {0, . . . , n − 1} suffices to discover a pure Nash equilibrium of a game coming from D n .
Exact Nash Equilibria
We lower-bound the number of single-payoff queries (the least constrained query model) needed to find an exact NE in an anonymous game. We exhibit games in which any algorithm must query most of the payoffs in order to determine what strategies form a NE. Difficult games are ones that only possess NE in which Ω(n) players must randomize.
Example 3.1. Let G be the following two-strategy, n-player anonymous game. Let n be even.
Half of the players have a utility function as shown by the top side (a) of Figure 2 , and the remaining half as at (b).
. . . . . . (a) Payoff table for "majority-seeking" player i
. . . (b) Payoff table for "minority-seeking" player i minority-seeking players. x denotes the number of players other than i who play 1. The key feature of the payoff function is that for a majority-seeking player, the advantage of playing 2 as opposed to 1 decreases linearly in x, and increases linearly in x for a minority-seeking player.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 shows that in any NE of G, at least n/2 players must use mixed strategies. Consequently the distribution of the number of players using either strategy has support ≥ n/2, so for a typical player it is necessary to check n/2 of his payoffs. Theorem 3.1. A single-payoff query algorithm may need to query Ω(n 2 ) payoffs in order to find an exact Nash equilibrium of an n-player game, even for two-strategy self-anonymous games.
Proof. We prove that in any exact equilibrium of G (Example 3.1), at least n/2 players must use mixed strategies. G is not self-anonymous, but we can then invoke Theorem 5.2, which reduces the problem of computing equilibria of anonymous games, to the computation of equilibria of self-anonymous games.
We proceed by arguing that in any Nash equilibrium of G, at least n/2 players must use mixed strategies. The result follows, since an equilibrium must then have support linear in n, and for a player who mixes, it becomes necessary to check, via queries, his payoffs for all these outcomes. We note in passing that G has an equilibrium in which all players mix with equal probabilities
Consider a NE of G and let p i be the probability that player i plays 1, in that equilibrium. Let P i 1 (s) denote the expected payoff of player i for playing strategy 1, minus the expected payoff of i for playing 2, in the (possibly mixed) strategy profile s. If, in a pure profile, x other players play strategy 1, then for a majority player i, P i 1 (s) = (
). By linearity of expectations, if in a mixed strategy s, x is the expected number of other players who play 1,
). Consequently, the incentive for a majority player i ′ to play 1 is
2n . Furthermore, the incentive for a minority player i ′ to play 2 is i =i ′
2n . Suppose a majority player i ′ mixes with probability p i ′ ∈ (0, 1).
The expected number of users of strategy 1 differs from the expected number of users of strategy 2 by less than 1. This means that no majority player may use a pure strategy; if he did, he would have an incentive to use the opposite strategy. It follows that all majority players must use mixed strategies.
Suppose a minority player i ′ who plays a mixed strategy uses p i ′ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose, in addition, all majority players play pure strategies. In that case, as before, any majority player would want to switch. So in this case, all majority players must mix, as before.
Finally, suppose all players play pure strategies. If strategies 1 and 2 both have the same number of users, then all majority players will want to switch. Alternatively, if, say, strategy 1 is used by more than n/2 players, it will be being used by a minority player who will want to switch. Thus, all majority players must use mixed strategies.
This means that (for each majority player) at least n/2 payoffs need to be known for the computation of expected utilities. If one of these payoffs is unknown, there remains the possibility that it could take an alternative value that results in that player no longer being indifferent between 1 and 2, and having an incentive to deviate.
3.1 A game whose solution must have irrational numbers [15] note as an open problem, the question of whether there is a two-strategy anonymous game whose Nash equilibria require players to mix with irrational probabilities. The following example shows that such a game does indeed exist, even with just 3 players. In the context of the present paper, it is a further motivation for our focus on approximate rather than exact Nash equilibria.
Example 3.2. Consider the following anonymous game represented in normal form in Figure 3 and in its anonymous form in Figure 4 . We show that in the unique equilibrium, the row, the column, and the matrix players must randomize respectively with probabilities
2 ( Theorem 3.2. There exists a three-player, two-strategy anonymous game that has a unique Nash equilibrium where all the players must randomize with irrational probabilities.
Proof. We use the game in Example 3.2, which is represented in anonymous form in Figure 4 . It is easy to check that the game admits no pure Nash equilibrium. Let r, c, m denote the row, column, and matrix player, respectively. Further, let p i denote the amount of probability that i ∈ {r, c, m} allocates to strategy 1. Suppose, for the moment, that the game admits only fully-mixed equilibria. Then, these can be found by solving the following system of equations, which results from making everyone indifferent.
and whose unique solution in the interval [0, 1] is
Now we show that everybody must indeed randomize in order to be in equilibrium. Suppose we fix player r to play 1. Given this, it is easy to see that both c and m must play 2, making r unhappy and willing to move to strategy 2. If we fix r to play 2, then m plays 2 and c plays 1. However, r would be better off deviating to strategy 1. Similar arguments can prove that we cannot fix c to any of the two strategies nor m to play 1. The most interesting case is when we fix m to play 2. Given this, we must set p r = 
Pure equilibria of symmetric games
The query complexity lower bound of Section 3 led us to investigate whether we can find a NE in the class of symmetric games, using fewer queries. We show that this is indeed the case in the context of two-strategy symmetric games and k-strategy self-symmetric games, both of which always possess pure Nash equilibria (PNE). Since in symmetric games every player shares the same utility function, the following results are w.r.t. single-payoff queries. Proposition 4.1. A Nash equilibrium of any 2-strategy n-player symmetric game can be found with O(log n) single-payoff queries.
Proof. Algorithm 1 uses a binary search approach to find a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE). We know that a PNE must exist, and we show that the algorithm correctly finds one. Note that when the conditions are met for returning an output, we have found a PNE. We show inductively that if a PNE is in the search space of the k-th round and not yet found, then there is a PNE in the search space of round k + 1.
The base case is trivial since the search space is {0, . . . , n − 1}. Suppose that after k recursive calls a PNE is still in the search space but not found yet. We need to show that there is still a PNE in the search space of step k + 1. Let {α k , . . . , β k } be the search space at step k. Let
⌋ as in the algorithm. Since m k does not lead to an equilibrium, the algorithm makes a case distinction. Note that, by construction, 
, we have that the search space is {α k , . . . , m k }. Due to the induction hypothesis, a PNE is located at an x ∈ {α k , . . . , β k }. Hence we only need to show that a PNE is located at an x ≤ m k −1. A PNE must be there since otherwise it must always holds that u 1 (x) < u 2 (x) for all x ∈ {α k , . . . , m k }, contradicting the fact that, by construction, u 1 (α k ) ≥ u 2 (α k ). The other case is symmetric. If u 1 (m k ) ≥ u 2 (m k ), then the resulting search space is {m k , . . . , β k }. No PNE would require having u 1 (x) ≥ u 2 (x) for all x ∈ {m k , . . . , β k }. We know, however, that u 1 (β k −1) < u 2 (β k −1), which is a contradiction.
Finally, note that the number of recursive calls made by Algorithm 1 is Θ(log n), with a constant number of queries per recursive call, giving us the claimed logarithmic query complexity.
The following lower bound is given on the restricted class of self-symmetric games and makes the above algorithm asymptotically optimal. We use u : Π k n −→ [0, 1] to denote the utility function of any player i due to its independence from i. Proposition 4.2. Any algorithm that finds a pure Nash equilibrium in a two-strategy, nplayer self-symmetric game needs to make Ω(log n) single-payoff queries in the worst case.
Proof. A two-strategy game that is both symmetric and self-anonymous is defined in terms of a utility function u : {0, . . . , n} → [0, 1] mapping the number of players who use strategy 1, to a single payoff that all players receive. A pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) corresponds to a local optimum of u.
We restrict ourselves to functions u having a unique local optimum OP T u ; thus u(x) increases monotonically and then decreases monotonically as x increases. Assume also that u(0) = u(n) = 0. We consider an adversary who answers queries so as to achieve the following objective. At any point, there is a range that is known to contain OP T u ; each answer to a query should reduce that range by a factor of at most 2. This is achieved as follows. Let {x 1 , . . . , x 2 } be the solution range, and x q be a query point. If x 1 < x q < x 2 , then output a payoff that is slightly higher than previously-observed payoffs, and let the new solution range be the larger of {x 1 , . . . , x q } and {x q , . . . , x 2 }. If x q ≤ x 1 or x q ≥ x 2 , choose a payoff that interpolates between the closest known values to x q .
With this approach, the adversary can ensure Ω(log(n)) queries need to be made, as claimed.
Moving to k-strategy self-symmetric games, these are a special case of pure coordination games where every pure-strategy profile yields the same utility to all players [5] . So, once again such a game possesses a pure Nash equilibrium corresponding to a local maximum of the utility function u. The following results identify the deterministic and randomized payoff query complexity of finding a PNE in k-strategy self-symmetric games, for any constant k. This is done by relating it to the problem of finding a local optimum of a real-valued function f on a regular grid graph (Lemma 4.1), about which much is known, and then applying those pre-existing results. Of interest to us is the d-dimensional regular grid graph;
, where edges are only present between two vertices that differ by 1 in a single coordinate, and other coordinates are equal.
Lemma 4.1. For any constant k, the query complexity of searching for a pure Nash equilibrium of k-strategy n-player self-symmetric games, is within a constant factor of the query complexity of searching for a local optimum of the grid graph [n] k−1 .
Proof. Given a self-symmetric game G, let G(G) be the graph of pure-strategy profiles of G, whose edges are single-player deviations. We seek a vertex of G(G) which forms a local optimum of u.
We start by reducing the problem of searching for an optimum of a function f of the vertices of [n] k−1 to the search for a PNE of a k-strategy self-symmetric game G. First, extend f to the domain ({0} ∪ [n]) k−1 in such a way that no local optimum of f occurs at a point with a zero coordinate. Assume that the codomain of f is [0, 1]. Construct G with kn players and k strategies as follows. Let s = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) be a typical anonymous pure profile of G, where x j denotes the number of players who play strategy j. If 0 ≤ x j ≤ n for each j < k, set u(s) equal to f (p), where p is the corresponding point in [n] k−1 . For the remaining profiles (the red area of Figure 5 , depicting the case k = 2), we assign them negative utilities in such a way that none of them are local optima of u. Consequently, any PNE of G corresponds to a local optimum of f , so the query complexity of G is at least the query complexity of finding a local optimum of f . Note that the description size of G is larger than that of f by just a linear factor (the value of the k-th entry of a pure profile of G is determined by the previous k − 1 entries).
Next we reduce the query-based search for a PNE of a n-player k-strategy G to the problem of locally optimizing a function f on a k-dimensional grid graph. We use the graph of them are solutions. Reducing in this direction, we have to deal with non-grid edges of G(G) whose presence may cause some profile not to be a PNE (the diagonal edges in Figure 5 ). Such edges correspond to a player switching from a strategy in {1, . . . , k − 1} to another strategy in {1, . . . , k − 1} (as opposed to switching to/from strategy k, which correspond to the grid edges). We deal with this by designing the function f in terms of u such that each query of the game is simulated by a constant number of queries of the grid [n] k−1 . If a vertex v of G(G) belongs to one or more triangles {v, v ′ , v ′′ } for which {v ′ , v ′′ } is a non-grid edge, then if u(v) < u(v ′ ) and u(v) < u(v ′′ ), f (v) is set equal to (u(v ′ ) + u(v ′′ ))/2, and if v belongs to multiple such triangles, the largest such value is used. Otherwise, f is set equal to u. This construction of f from u gets rid of local optima that may arise from deleting the diagonal edges (for the purpose of embedding in [n] k−1 ), and remaining local optima of f correspond to local optima of u. For constant k, a query to f can be computed by a constant number of queries to u, so the query complexities (as functions of n) are linearly related. 
Self-anonymous Games
We show that in self-anonymous games, if every player uses the uniform distribution over her actions, this mixed profile constitutes a O (1/ √ n)-WSNE. This means that no query is needed to find any such approximation. We provide an inductive proof on the constant number of actions k. First, we demonstrate that this holds for two-strategy games and subsequently utilize this result as the base case of the induction. We prove the following lemma below although, in fact, it also follows from the combination of Lemma 7.1 and Lemma 7.5 with ǫ = 1/2.
Lemma 5.1. In any two-strategy n-player self-anonymous game, the mixed-strategy profile
Proof. We will show that for any player i ∈ [n], we have
To prove (1), we analyse the expected value to player 1 of strategy 1 minus that of strategy 2 as follows:
where in the second step we applied the self-anonymity property, in the third step we used the definition of the p.m.f. of the binomial distribution, and in the fourth one we simply rearranged terms. Since the utility function outputs values in [0, 1], then u i 1 (n − 1) − u i 2 (0) ≤ 1. Moreover, for all x = 1, . . . , 
+1
n − 1
By Stirling's bounds, we know that √ 2π · n n+1/2 · e −n ≤ n! ≤ e · n n+1/2 · e −n . Hence,
This gives the required upper bounded on the value of strategy 1 minus that of strategy 2. The value of strategy 2 minus that of strategy 1 has the same analysis and upper bound, which gives us (1).
Theorem 5.1. For constant k, in any k-strategy n-player self-anonymous game letting every player randomize uniformly is a O (1/ √ n)-WSNE.
Proof.
We proceed by induction on the number of strategies k where the base case k = 2 follows by Lemma 5.1. Suppose that it holds that in any (k − 1)-strategy n-player selfanonymous game, every player i ∈ [n] mixing uniformly is a O (1/ √ n)-WSNE. We show that this holds also for k strategies. Let G k be a k-strategy self-anonymous game. Moreover, let X (ℓ) i be a random variable indicating whether player i plays strategy ℓ. Let X (k)
denote the number of players other than i playing strategy k in G k . We observe that E X (k)
k , so by Chernoff bounds, we have that
thus, exponentially small in n for constant k. We bound the difference in player i's utility between two strategies, say, 1 and 2, which is
where the utility function u i j takes as input the number x m of players playing strategy m, for all m = 1, . . . , k.
Next we decompose this into the contributions to the expected difference between i's utility for 1 and 2, arising from the event that x k players play strategy k:
Observe that when we sum over x 2 , . . . , x k−1 but not x k , we are dealing with an (n − x k )-player (k − 1)-strategy game G k−1 where all (n − x k ) players are still randomizing uniformly among the k − 1 strategies. To see this, we could think of fixing the identities of the x k players playing strategy k to be {n − x k + 1, . . . , n} but G k−1 is anonymous, i.e., invariant under permutations of the players. By induction hypothesis, we can bound the difference in payoff
. We can, therefore, write the difference in utilities between 1 and 2 as n−1
where the first inequality used Equation (2) . We should perhaps note that in summing over big-oh expressions, the hidden constant in the notation is the same for all terms in the summation (namely, one that applies for k − 1 strategy games, which exists by inductive hypothesis). As long as k is a constant, we have the above claimed upper bound. In addition, notice that if k is not a constant, the result no longer holds since the proof adds a constant factor of k! into the big-oh notation.
Corollary 5.1. For any constant k, no payoff queries are needed to find a O(1/ √ n)-approximate equilibrium in k-strategy n-player self-anonymous games.
The following Theorem 5.2 extends an idea of Lemma 1 of [5] , which reduces the computation of an exact equilibrium of a two-strategy anonymous game to a two-strategy selfanonymous game. Theorem 5.2 goes further, showing that to some extent approximations can be preserved. We apply it to prove Corollary 5.4, that the problem of finding an FPTAS in two-strategy anonymous games reduces to finding an FPTAS in two-strategy self-anonymous games. Below, we also discuss why Theorem 5.2 does not extend straightforwardly to more than two strategies. [2] ) be a two-strategy anonymous game, and let G := (n, 2, {ū i j } i∈[n],j∈ [2] ) be the following self-anonymous game.ū i 2 (x + 1) is set equal tō u i 1 (x) for all x, as required forḠ to be self-anonymous. Then,
for all x ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1},
A mixed strategy profile s = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) is an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium in G if and only if it is an ǫ 2n -approximate Nash equilibrium inḠ. Proof. First of all, we remark that dividing by 2n ensures having all the payoffs in [0, 1]. Let X j denote a Bernoulli random variable indicating whether player j plays strategy 1, whose expectation is E[X j ] := p j for all j ∈ [n], and let X −i := j =i X j .
=⇒: We now show that if a strategy profile s = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) is an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium in G, then it is an ǫ 2n -approximate Nash equilibrium inḠ. Assume for contradiction that s is not an ǫ 2n -approximate Nash equilibrium inḠ. Hence, there must be some player i ∈ [n] that gains strictly more than ǫ 2n by deviating to either strategy 1 or 2, i.e.,
for some ℓ ∈ [2] . We make a case distinction on ℓ. Case ℓ = 1: We have that
which by definition is equivalent to
If we apply our payoff transformation rule on the RHS, we have
which reduces to
Applying the definition of expected utility we have
Therefore, we contradict the fact that s is an ǫ-equilibrium for G since i prefers deviating to strategy 1 also in G. Case ℓ = 2: We have that
and, by applying the same arguments, we have
Therefore, we contradict the fact that s is an ǫ-equilibrium for G since i prefers deviating to strategy 2 also in G. ⇐=: We now show that the converse is also true. The proof is very similar to the previous one. We assume for contradiction that s is not an ǫ-equilibrium in G. Then,
for some ℓ ∈ [2] . We make, again, a case distinction on ℓ. Case ℓ = 1: We have that
If we apply our transformation
contradicting the assumption that s is an ǫ 2n -equilibrium inḠ. Case ℓ = 2: Similarly, we have that
which, as in the above case, reduces to having
contradicting the assumption that s is an ǫ 2n -equilibrium inḠ.
Corollary 5.2. Let G,Ḡ be defined as above. A strategy profile s = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) is a Nash equilibrium in G if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium inḠ.
Proof. Use Theorem 5.2 with ǫ = 0.
Corollary 5.3. Finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-strategy anonymous game is as hard as finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-strategy self-anonymous game.
Proof. Given any two-strategy anonymous game G, we can certainly constructḠ in time that is linear in the size of G, i.e., O(n 2 ). By Corollary 5.2, the two games have the same set of equilibria.
Corollary 5.4. If there is an FPTAS for two-strategy self-anonymous games, then there is also an FPTAS for two-strategy anonymous games.
Proof. Pick any two-strategy anonymous game G, constructḠ and find a δ-equilibrium for δ = ǫ 2n . Since there is an FPTAS, we have a running time that is poly(n, 1/δ). For δ = ǫ 2n , the running time clearly is poly(n, 1/ǫ). Theorem 5.2 implies that a δ-equilibrium inḠ is an ǫ-equilibrium in G.
We end this section with a brief discussion of why Theorem 5.2 (and hence Corollaries 5.2,5.3,5.4) does not extend straightforwardly to more than two strategies. In the context of 3-strategy games, let u i j (x, y, z) denote player i's utility when amongst the n − 1 remaining players, x play 1, y play 2, and z play 3. If there were, say, 16 players, note that to be self-anonymous, the corresponding gameḠ would need to satisfȳ (6, 5, 4) . That is, the pairwise differences between the three values given by the above displayed formulae, are required to be proportionate to pairwise differences between three pairs of payoffs in G, which themselves may take any values in [0, 1]. Hence we get a conflict between the constraints that result from a natural approach to generalising the result. It may be that (for k > 2) there exists a more complicated reduction from an FPTAS for k-strategy games to an FPTAS for k-strategy self-anonymous games, perhaps by increasing the number of players.
Two-strategy Lipschitz Games
Lipschitz games are anonymous games where every player's utility function is Lipschitzcontinuous, in the sense that for all i ∈ [n], all j ∈ [k], and all x, y ∈ Π k n−1 , it holds that u i j (x) − u i j (y) ≤ λ x − y 1 , where λ ≥ 0 is the Lipschitz constant.
For games satisfying a Lipschitz condition with a small value of λ, e.g. inverse polynomial in n, we obtain positive results for approximation and query complexity. In the special case of games with two strategies per player, we show how a solution can be efficiently found via a binary search on {0, . . . , n − 1}. However, this binary-search approach cannot be used for k-strategy games with k > 2.
The following algorithms exploit our knowledge of the existence of pure approximate equilibria in Lipschitz games [2, 15] . Algorithm 2 is subsequently used in Section 7 as a subroutine of an algorithm for general (not necessarily Lipschitz) anonymous games. For notational convenience with regard to this subsequent result, in Algorithm 2 and Theorem 6.1 we useḠ to denote the input game rather than G.
Definition 6.1. Let (j, x) ∈ {1, 2} × {0, . . . , n − 1} be the input for an all-players query. For δ ≥ 0, a δ-accurate all-players query returns a tuple of values (f 1
e., they are within an additive δ of the correct payoffs (u 1 j (x), . . . , u n j (x)).
Algorithm 2: Approximate NE Lipschitz
Data: δ-accurate query access to utility functionū of n-player λ-Lipschitz gameḠ.
Result: pure-strategy 3(δ + λ)-NE ofḠ. Remaining players are allocated either 1 or 2, subject to the constraint that x or x + 1 players in total play 1. returnp. end Theorem 6.1. LetḠ = n, 2, {ū i j } i∈[n],j∈{1,2} be an n-player, two-strategy λ-Lipschitz anonymous game. Algorithm 2 finds a pure-strategy 3(λ + δ)-WSNE using 4 log n δ-accurate allplayers payoff queries.
Proof. Consider the function φ : {0, . . . , n − 1} −→ {−n, . . . , n} defined in Algorithm 2. It can be readily checked that if BR 1 (0) = 0 or BR 1 (n − 1) = n, then the solutions returned are correct. Alternatively, the algorithm has to find x such that φ(x) > 0 and φ(x + 1) ≤ 0, in the case when φ(0) > 0 and φ(n − 1) ≤ 0, and it is clear that log n evaluations of φ suffice to find x. Moreover, notice that a candidate x can be checked using the following 4 all-players queries: (1, x), (2, x), (1, x + 1), (2, x + 1). Hence, we need in total 4 log n queries to find x.
The main task is to prove that given x satisfying these conditions, a pure profilep can indeed be constructed in the way described, and thatp is indeed an approximate equilibrium.
Suppose for a contradiction thatp could not be constructed in the way described. For example, suppose that more than x + 1 players are required to play 1 due to satisfyinḡ u i 1 (x) −ū i 2 (x) > 2δ. We argue that this would contradict that φ(x + 1) ≤ 0. The fact that φ(x + 1) ≤ 0 means that there are n − (x + 1) players whose payoffs to play 2 (when x + 1 others play 1) are at most 2δ less than their payoffs to play 1 (when x+1 others play 1). When these players play 2, they are 2δ-best-responding if x + 1 players play 1, and by the Lipschitz condition are 2(λ + δ)-best-responding if x players play 1. So there is in fact a solution with only x+1 players playing 1. A similar argument rules out the possibility that too many players are required to play 2.
The fact thatp is a 3(λ+ δ)-approximate equilibrium follows from the constraints imposed on which pure strategy is allocated to each player.
General Two-strategy Anonymous Games
First, we present our main result (Theorem 7.1). Afterwards, we prove a lower bound on the number of queries that any randomized algorithm needs to make to find any ǫ-WSNE.
Upper Bound
Before going into technical lemmas, we provide an informal overview of the algorithmic approach. Suppose we are to solve an n-player game G. The first idea is to "smooth" every player's utility function, so that it becomes λ-Lipschitz continuous for some λ. We smooth a utility function by requiring every player to use some amount of randomness. Specifically, for some small ζ we make every player place probability either ζ or 1 − ζ onto strategy 1. Consequently, the expected payoff for player i is obtained by averaging her payoff values w.r.t. a sum of two binomial distributions, consisting of a discrete bell-shaped distribution whose standard deviation is at least ζ √ n. We construct the smooth gameḠ in the following manner. The payoff received inḠ by player i when x other players are playing strategy 1 is given by the expected payoff received in G by player i when x other players play 1 with probability 1 − ζ and n − 1 − x other players play 1 with probability ζ. This creates a λ-Lipschitz gameḠ with λ = O (1/ζ √ n).
Due to dealing with a two-strategy Lipschitz game, we can use the bisection method of Algorithm 2. If we were allowed to queryḠ directly, a logarithmic number of all-players queries would suffice. Unfortunately, this is not the case; thus, we need to simulate a query toḠ with a small number of queries to the original game G. Those queries are randomly sampled from the mixed anonymous profile above, and we take enough samples to ensure we get good estimates of the payoffs inḠ with sufficiently high probability.
Thus, we are able to find an approximate pure Nash equilibrium ofḠ withÕ( √ n) allplayers queries. This equilibrium is mapped back to G by letting the players who play strategy 1 inḠ, play it with probability 1 − ζ in G, and the ones who play strategy 2 inḠ place probability ζ on strategy 1 in G. The quality of the approximation is proportional to ζ + (ζ √ n) −1 . Before presenting our main algorithm (Algorithm 3) and proving its efficiency (Theorem 7.1), we state the following lemmas that are used in the proof.
Lemma 7.1 ( [15] ). Let X, Y be two random variables over {0, . . . , n} such that X − Y TV ≤ δ (where X − Y TV denotes the total variation distance between X and Y , i.e., 1/2·
Lemma 7.2 (Simulation of a query toḠ (Algorithm 3)). Let δ, τ > 0. Let X be the sum of n−1 Bernoulli random variables representing a mixed profile of n−1 players in an n-player game G. Suppose we want to estimate, with additive error δ, the expected payoffs E[u i j (X)] for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ {1, 2}. This can be done with probability ≥ 1 − τ using (1/2δ 2 ) · log (4n/τ ) all-players queries.
Proof. Suppose we draw a set of N random samples {Z 1 , . . . , Z N } from the probability distribution of X (which can be done by computing each Z i as a sum of 0/1 outcomes of n − 1 biased coin flips. For each Z ℓ and each j ∈ {1, 2} we can make an all-players query that tells us, for every player, that payoff obtained by that player for playing j when Z i other players play 1. So, a total of 2N queries are made.
. We can now use Hoeffding's inequality to get that
Since there are 2n quantities we desire to estimate (2 strategies per player) within additive error δ, we require a failure probability of at most τ /2n, so that with a union bound we get that the estimates have additive error ≤ δ with probability at least 1 − τ . Thus, we need that 2exp −2δ 2 N ≤ τ /2n, which is satisfied for N ≥ (1/2δ 2 ) · log(4n/τ ). where we use {a} to denote the fractional part of a.
In the second to last step we used the fact that ⌊np⌋ + 1 ≥ np. In the last one we used both {np} < 1 and 1 − p ≥ ζ. Next we bound the value at x = ⌊np⌋ using Stirling's bounds.
If we combine Pr
Lemma 7.4. Let Z := n i=1 Z i be the sum of n independent 0-1 random variables such that for some 0 < ζ ≤ 1/2, E[Z i ] ∈ {ζ, 1 − ζ} for all i ∈ [n]. Then, the probability value at Z's
Proof. Z = X +Y for binomial random variables X, Y with X ∼ B(n X , ζ) and Y ∼ B(n Y , 1− ζ), where n X + n Y = n. Z's probability mass function can be written as
Since n X + n Y = n, we have max{n X , n Y } ≥ n/2 = Ω(n). Assume n X be the maximum. Then, by Lemma 7.3 
) for all x = 0, . . . , n X . Hence,
Lemma 7.5. Let X (j,n) := i∈[n] X i denote the sum of n independent 0/1 random variables where E[X i ] = 1 − ζ for all i ≤ j, and E[X i ] = ζ for all i > j. Then, for all j ∈ [n], we have
Proof. We use the following recursive formula for the probability mass function of a Poisson Binomial Distribution, as described in [23] . Due to this not depending on j, we use X ( * ,n) to denote a sum of n independent 0/1 random variables whose expectations can potentially be all different. Then if p n is the expectation of the n-th variable,
We want to bound the total variation distance between X (j−1,n) and X (j,n) , i.e.,
Note that X (j−1,n) and X (j,n) differ only by how one coin flip is biased. Thus, we can use (3) to write
If we combine these with the total variation distance expression, we have the following expression for variation distance:
By definition of X (j,n−1) and Lemma 7.4 we know that Pr[
) for any i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Let m be the mode of X (j−1,n−1) . Due to X (j−1,n−1) being unimodal, we can split the sum
. . , m} and {m + 1, . . . , n − 1} where Pr[X (j−1,n−1) = i] is, respectively, increasing or decreasing and, hence, remove the absolute value operator. Consider the summation over {0, . . . , m}; the other case is symmetric. Then,
Summing up both the increasing and decreasing side bounds, we get that
Substituting back to the variation distance expression and observing that 1 − 2ζ < 1, we obtain
as in the statement of the Lemma.
Definition 7.1. Let G = (n, 2, {u i j } i∈[n],j∈{1,2} ) be an anonymous game. For ζ > 0, the ζ-smoothed version of G is a gameḠ = (n, 2, {ū i j } i∈[n],j∈{1,2} ) defined as follows. Let X (x) −i := ℓ =i X ℓ denote the sum of n − 1 Bernoulli random variables where x of them have expectation equal to 1 − ζ, and the remaining ones have expectation equal to ζ. The payoffū i j (x) obtained by player i ∈ [n] for playing strategy j ∈ {1, 2} against x ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} is
,j∈{1,2} ) be an anonymous game. For ǫ satisfying 1/ǫ = O(n 1/4 ), Algorithm 3 can be used to find (with probability ≥ 3 4 ) an ǫ-NE of G, using O( √ n · log 2 n) all-players queries (hence, O(n 3/2 ·log 2 n) single-payoff queries) in time O(n 3/2 ·log 2 n).
Proof. Set ζ equal to ǫ and letḠ be the ζ-smoothed version of G. We claim thatḠ is a λ-Lipschitz game for
−i be as in Definition 7.1. By Lemma 7.5,
Theorem 6.1 shows that Algorithm 2 finds a pure-strategy 3(λ + δ)-WSNE ofḠ, using O(log n) δ-accurate all-players queries. Thus, Algorithm 2 finds a O(
where δ is the additive accuracy of queries.
Despite not being allowed to queryḠ directly, we can simulate any δ-accurate query toḠ with a set of randomized all-players queries to G. This is done in the body of Algorithm 3. By Lemma 7.2, for τ > 0, (1/2δ 2 ) log(4n/τ ) randomized queries to G correctly simulate a δ-accurate query toḠ with probability ≥ 1 − τ .
In total, the algorithm makes O log n · (1/δ 2 ) · log(n/τ ) all-players payoff queries to G. With a union bound over the 4 log n simulated queries toḠ, this works with probability 1 − 4τ log n.
Once we find this pure-strategy O 1 ζ √ n + δ -WSNE ofḠ, the last part of Algorithm 3 maps the pure output profile to a mixed one where whoever plays 1 inḠ places probability (1 − ζ) on 1, and whoever plays 2 inḠ places probability ζ on 1. It is easy to verify that the regret experienced by player i (that is, the difference in payoff between i's payoff and i's best-response payoff) in G is at most ζ more than the one she experiences inḠ.
The extra additive ζ to the regret of players means that we have an ǫ-NE of G with
). The query complexity thus is O(log n · (1/δ 2 ) · log(n/τ )).
√ n, τ = 1/16 log n, we find an O(1/ 4 √ n)-Nash equilibrium using O( √ n · log 2 n) all-players queries with probability at least 3/4. We remark that the above parameters can be chosen to satisfy any given approximation guarantee ǫ ≥ n −1/4 , i.e., simply find solutions to the equation ǫ = ζ + δ + (ζ √ n) −1 . This allows for a family of algorithms parameterized by ǫ, for ǫ ∈ [n −1/4 , 1), thus an approximation scheme.
The runtime is equal to the number of single-payoff queries and can be calculated as follows. Calculating the value of φ(i) in Algorithm 2 takes O(n √ n log n). We make O( √ n log n) queries to G to simulate one inḠ, and once we gather all the information, we need an additional linear time factor to count the number of players whose best response is 1. The fact that the above part is performed at every step of the binary search implies a total running time of O(n 3/2 · log 2 n) for Algorithm 2. Algorithm 3 simply invokes Algorithm 2 and only needs linear time to construct the profile p; thus, it runs in the same time.
Lower Bound
Finally, we consider the question of lower bounds that are complementary to Theorem 7.1. We use the minimax principle and thus define a distribution over instances that will lead to the lower bound on query complexity, for any deterministic algorithm. We specify a distribution over certain games that possess a unique pure Nash equilibrium. The n players that participate in any of these games are partitioned into log n groups, which are numbered from 1 to log n. Group i's equilibrium strategy depends on what all the previous groups {1, . . . , i − 1} play at equilibrium. Hence, finding out what the last group should play leads to a lower bound of Ω(log n) all-players queries. Proof. We show by induction on q that the expected length of the longest common prefix between A and the q-th queried bit-string is at most 2q. We use B (q) to denote the queried input at step q.
Suppose A makes one query. Then, the expected prefix length is
Thus, the base case holds. Now, assume E[lcp(A, Hence, A needs to make at least d/2 queries in order to output a prefix of expected length equal to d.
Lemma 7.7. Let G n be the class of n-player two-strategy anonymous games such that u i 1 (x) = 1−u i 2 (x) and u i 1 (x) ∈ {0, 1}, for all i ∈ [n], x ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}. Then, there exists a distribution D n over G n such that every G drawn from D n has a unique (pure-strategy) ǫ-WSNE.
Proof. Let n = 2 k , and let the first n − 1 players be partitioned into sets N 1 , . . . , N k such that |N j | = n/2 j for all j ∈ [k]. Let I j := 0, . . . , 2 j−1 − 1 . Moreover, let 1 ≻ x i 2 denote player i preferring strategy 1 to strategy 2 given that x other players are playing strategy 1. We use 1 ≻ I P 2 to mean that 1 ≻ x i 2 for all i ∈ P and all x ∈ I. Furthermore, all players i ∈ N j share the same preferences.
We define D n in the following manner. For all j ∈ [k], let N j flip |I j | fair coins, one associated to each subset S j,ℓ := ℓ 2 j−1 n, . . . , ℓ+1 2 j−1 n − 1 , with ℓ ∈ I j , to decide whether they prefer strategy 1 to 2 within S j,ℓ . This means that N j 's preferences over a subset S j,ℓ do not depend on what N j prefer at some different S j,m ⊂ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Player n, who belongs to no set N j , flips a coin for every ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. In particular, with probability 1/2, N 1 always prefer strategy 1 to 2, and with probability 1/2, 2 to 1.
Every game G drawn from D n has the feature of having a unique PNE. Moreover, N j 's unique best response at equilibrium depends on what N 1 , . . . , N j−1 play. An application of iterated elimination of dominated strategies suffices to verify the two claims. Further, it can be shown, e.g., by induction on j, that in any ǫ-WSNE (ǫ < 1), no member of N j would place positive probability onto her worst-response. Theorem 7.2. Let G n be defined as in Lemma 7.7. Then, for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1), any randomized all-players query algorithm must make Ω(log n) queries to find an ǫ-WSNE of G n in the worst case.
Proof. We use an adversarial distribution D n over G n and apply the minimax principle to lower-bound the expected cost that any deterministic algorithm must incur. We let D n be defined as in Lemma 7.7, so that it has a unique ǫ-WSNE, and show that learning this equilibrium is equivalent to learning an unknown log(n)-long bit-string as in Lemma 7.6.
If we associate a random indicator variable Y j to N j that is equal to 1 if and only if N j are playing strategy 1 at equilibrium, then y := ences for every consecutive subset S ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1} of size n 2 j−1 . Assume, w.l.o.g., that A ℓ = 1 and B ℓ = 0. Let m ∈ {ℓ + 1, . . . , k − 1}. N m 's payoff at x and N m 's payoff at any x ′ such that |x − x ′ | ≥ n 2 ℓ correspond to two independent coin flips, i.e., it is useless to know that B j = A j for all j ∈ {ℓ + 1, . . . , k} since N ℓ must play 1. Furthermore, any attempt to guess Y ℓ+1 . . . Y k fails with probability 1 − 2 ℓ+1−k .
For any random log(n)-long bit-string Y there exists a game G in the support of D n whose unique pure-strategy ǫ-WSNE is equal to Y . By Lemma 7.6, the expected number of queries needed by any algorithm A to discover Y is Ω(log n).
Conclusions and Further Work
Our interest in the query complexity of anonymous games has resulted in an algorithm that has an improved runtime-efficiency guarantee, although limited to when the number of strategies k is equal to 2. Algorithm 3 (Theorem 7.1) finds an ǫ-NE faster than the PTAS of [15] , for any ǫ ≥ 1/ 4 √ n. In particular, for ǫ = 1/ 4 √ n, their algorithm runs in subexponential time, while ours is justÕ(n 3/2 ); however, our ǫ-NE is not well-supported.
An immediate question is whether we can obtain sharper bounds on the query complexity of two-strategy games. There are ways to potentially strengthen the results. First, our lower bound holds for well-supported equilibria; it would be interesting to know whether a logarithmic number of queries is also needed to find an ǫ-NE for ǫ < 1 2 . We believe this is the case at least for small values of ǫ. Second, the ǫ-NE found by our algorithm are not well-supported since all players are forced to randomize. Is there a query-efficient algorithm that finds an ǫ-WSNE? Third, we may think of generalizing the algorithm to the (constant) k-strategy case by requiring every player to place probability either ζ k or 1 − k−1 k ζ and solve an associated Lipschitz game. However, in this case we can no longer use binary search to find a fixed point of the smooth game. As a consequence, the query complexity is likely to be substantially higher.
